DEVELOPMENT:
A SURVEY OF FINDINGS Henry J. Bruton
The present paper seeks to put into general view the major findings of the first twenty-five research memoranda (RM here after) of the Williams College research project on the import substitution approach to economic development. This paper is not a summary of the individual papers, and of course should not (indeed must not) be read in lieu of the other papers. Rather an effort has been made to draw from our previous studies the principal findings, and put them into as cohesive and comprehensive a whole as possible. I have searched for theoretical themes and for empirical results that not only were of interest in themselves, but which also seemed to add up to something that might legitimately be called an approach to development. To do this I asked three general questions: (1) What appears to be the essential mechanics of import substitution as it has been practiced in the various countries that we have investigated; (2) What problems have emerged (and why) as a consequence of the conventional import substitution (IS) strategy; (3) What have we found that suggests or leads toward an alternative approach to development that incorporates the good and eliminates the bad of the conventional?
The general conclusions that emerge from this survey may be summarized in the following way. Although the countries that -2 have built their development policies around import substitution have experienced great difficulties, there are reasons to believe that a satisfactory approach to development can be built around import substitution. The difficulties have arisen as a consequence of the activities selected for domestic development and of the methods employed to provide the incentives to bring about their development. Part of these difficulties arise from a view of the economic development process that now appears misleading, and part arise from assumptions about the developing economies that our evidence shows to be unacceptable. More specifically, we have found that the distortions and misallocations that have been imposed on the economy by the conventional approach to IS have themselves created difficulties that contributed significantly to the widespread failure of the approach to work as satisfactorily as many expected. To repeat the previous sentence in a slightly different way: to implement their IS policy, countries have chosen instruments and techniques that seem, in effect, to prevent that very policy from being successful.
On the other hand, there are important aspects of the IS approach that appear most useful indeed. The concept of a strategy is useful as is the idea of policies designed to create readily apparent investment opportunities. Similarly the notion that new activities must be established in the developing countries is equally acceptable and equally important. What we seek then is a way to achieve these advantages of IS without creating the dis tortions and misallocations that to date appear so ubiquitous and that appear responsible for its failures. Our work on remodelling the IS strategy is just beginning, and we believe that we under stand its difficulties more clearly than we understand where and how to modify it. This review therefore spends more time the on difficulties with IS than with more positive recommendations. The latter have however begun to receive our attention, and are implicit in many of the criticisms of the IS strategy as it has been used to date. It is important to keep in mind from the outset that our studies do not show that IS is necessarily futile.
What emerges is not a recommendation for abandonment, but rather one for a more careful approach to its implementation.
Section I examines briefly the notion of a strategy of development in general, and the origins of an IS strategy in particular. Section II looks at the IS strategy first in very broad te3ms, and then at some of its more specific aspects.
Section III considers some of the more positive results of our studies, and Section IV suggests a range of policy issues that are relevant, given our positive results. As noted these policy issues are not discussed at length here as they have yet to be fully analyzed in reseai-ch memoranda. This section then is some thing of a link with the past work and leads into our future work.
I
Both terms strategy of development and import substitution merit attention at the outset. We will begin with strategy in general and work our way into import substitution strategy in particular.
A. One may contrast strategy with theory of development in several ways. The latter teim seems to refer to an explanation of the sources of growth --to increased capital and labor, in creased productivity, improved resource allocation, demand condi tions --and how these sources act and interact to produce growth.
Development policies flowing from this kind cf analysis are con cerned with capital formation, saving rates, technical change, education, and. similar items. One looks also at rates of return on alternative investment opportunities, and at using resources to maximize present value of future income streams. Emphasis is placed on the availability of these sources of growth, and how they may be used to produce an acceptable growth rate.
Strategy, a concept introduced into the development literature by Albert Hirschman L-3_7 implies something a bit different. Specifically, it implies one (or both) of two things.
In the first place it suggests that by some twist or torment of the economy, or by some gimmick, the underdeveloped, stagnant economy can be in motion. set
The primary obstacle to development is not the absence or inadequate supply of the sources of growth.
Rather it is the absence of a catalyst that creates an environment or a circumstance that activates the already available, but unreal as well that supply limitations are not at the heart of the expla nation of why an economy does not grow, and imply that if the economy is given a big enough catalytic effort, it will begin to grow.
In the second place strategy is frequently used in dis cussions that distinguish between marginalism and structuralism, and may be seen most clearly with respect to the investment decision. This year's investment, small relative to the existing capital stock, may be allocated in accordance with conventional marginal productivity criteria. This small investment can increase output within the existing structure, but will not alter it. Yet, it is argued, the basic difficulty is a structural one. In general terms, structure in this context refers to the composition of output, techniques employed, import functions, land tenure arrange ments, educational system, class mobility,..... of an economy.
The policy objective then is not to so allocate investible resources that present values of income streams are amximized in the narrow sense. It is rather to use investible resources to create a new structure which, even with no increase in the quantity of resources, is presumed to yield a higher output than that possible within the existing system, and, what is more important, will permit continuing growth. In this context, strategy refers to an approach to development policy that seeks to modify the nature of the economy in quite fundamental ways on the assumption that such modification is necessary before sustained growth -s possible.
This strategy of development is most clearly Illustrated by the various works of Raul Prebisch and other Latin American "structuralists" r-8_7, and the various arguments of Maurice Dobbs
1_-7.
The notion appears in more orthodox circles as well. In discussing India's development I. M. D. Little writes, "Moreover it is very early for India to be able to guess where her comparative advantage will lie" Z-6_. A bit later in the same article, he says, "In a country as large as India with a wide complement of natural resources; it would be surprising if it did not turn out to be economical for India to produce a little of almost everything."
In both these statements Little is saying that in some future after India has changed her structure into some normal (?) optimal (?) state, then she will allocate resources in a manner to amximize in the conventional fashion. In the meantime presumably some (unstated) alternative criteria of allocation is to be used. Similarly in many of the instances where one reads that a country needs or requires specific capital items (usually contrary to the dictates of conventional maximizing procedure), the argument implicitly rests on some notion of a changed or new structure to be established.
These two bases of strategies are not mutually exclusive.
An incentive to change the structure can be used as a means of establishing a prime mover. And the objective of a policy or a strategy may indeed be to accomplish both. At the same time there are advantages in keeping the ideas distinct, and reference will be made to both origins, a prime mover origin and a structure changing origin, of strategies.
Consider now more specifically import substitution as a strategy of development. To a very large extent it was arrived at by default, and is not only the most common (frequently observed) strategy in practice, but it is indeed perhaps the only one. This is true partly because IS encompasses some other possible strategies and partly because it is easily initiated. Indeed it seems clear that most developing countries tend to slip into an IS approach to development. In this case then IS is not a strategy in the sense of a carefully planned approach, but rather a situation into which a country tends to find itself as the development effort is made.
It is this ease of initiation that seems to be the major (but not exclusive) source of the prevalence of IS's popularity.
To curtail imports in order to create investment opportunities or to change the structure is a relatively simple matter. 1 If a be "easy," not its effective implementation. A principal aim of later sections of this paper is to examine the implementation question.
country decided on an export promotion strategy however it is not so evident how to begin. Similarly, to build a development strategy around industrialization without IS does not lend itself to an obvious set of policies. The same may be said of a strategy built around increasing agricultural productivity.
One may then visualize the origins of IS in somewhat the following way: Policymakers become aware (or convinced) that conventional optimizing criteria cannot (do not) lead to policies that produce as rapid a rate of growth as desirable either because the need for an explicit prime mover or because the existing structure of the system is (or is thought to be) alien to growth.
The policymaker then searches for an alternative guide to policy making, one that will step up the rate of investment and create a larger number and more obvious investment opportunities. Even if it is assumed that a number of strategies is examined, the IS strategy is likely to be selected because it apparently calls merely for keeping out imports, a task most governments can be expected to accomplish. It is a bit misleading therefore to rely on changes in the aggre gate ratio to identify the effectiveness of IS policies aimed at changing the proportion of total absorption of a good that is imported.
The issue can be put into an understandable framework by identifying the objective of IS policies that are aimed at reducing imports of specific commodities. Few policymakers actually wish to shut out all imports. Rather, as already noted, the objective is structural change or some kind of investment incentive creating idea. Part of the rationale of the structural change objective is that the existing structure makes the economy undesirably dependent on matters outside its own control. One of the guides to action then is how can the structure be changed so that the economy is less at the mercy of its foreign trade activities?
The extent of the achievement of such an objective is not easily measured at all, and certainly not by means of changes over time in the import-GNP ratio.
The picture then seems to be this. Developing countries have not achieved sustained growth because of their structure or their lack of a prime mover. The IS strategy to change this structure and to provide a Primum Jobile is to replace imports by domestic production of certain commodities. Thus IS in the narrow sense is limited to specific activities and is measured by increases in the ratio of domestic production to total domestic absorption.
In the broader sense import substituting within indi vidual sectors is a means to the more far-reaching objectives just stated. These latter objectives mean that the long-run success of IS rests heavily on the specific sectors in which import substi tution is carried out, and the methods chosen to bring about their domestic expansion. An analysis of the IS strategy of development therefore involves an examination of the rationale of the selection of these activities, and the consequences of the methods and poli cies used to bring about the import substitution. On this latter issue, interest is primarily d~rected toward the effect of these policies on the growth of the economy. The twenty-five research memoranda reviewed here have as their common bond concern with these two issues.
II
In this Section we first examine the broad pattern of IS as it has evolved over the last fifteen years or so.
Then we look at a number of features of this pattern that stand out in the broader, overall picture. In the following Section we try to establish a series of positive conclusions that follow from this discussion of the main characteristics of the IS model.
A. The General Nature of Import Substitution
As noted in Section II the immediate approach of an IS policy is to replace imports of specific activities with domestic production. Without a doubt the simplest way to do this in a market economy is to impose limitations on imports. This limitation on imports has a variety of impacts (RM-2). It creates gaps in the economy that make for obvious investment opportunities in non traditional activities of the economy, usually manufacturing.
Resources are then directed into new industrial channels (struc tural change) and the capitalist sector is enlarged. One gets then what David Felix Z-2_7 has called "pre mature widening" of the productive structure, i.e., an expansion into a large number of relative small-scale activities rather than a concentration on a few. Advantages accruing from scale effects are at best limited to a handful of activities, and may well be absent entirely.
2. If IS is to continue, the economy must move more heavily into intermediate or capital goods production. Phis shift not only raises the direct cost of growth (the cost of the domestic produc tion of capital goods or intermediate goods is larger relative to their import costs than is the case with respect to the consumer goods for which domestic supply has already replaced imports), but it also affects the costs of production and the level of existing protection on the new consumer goods industries. Evidently if a new producer of consumer goods had been using imported inter mediate (or capital) goods in the first stage, and is now forced into using higher cost (and probably lower quality) domestically produced inputs, his production costs will rise. Similarly at the prevailing tariff rates, protection on the value added of consumer goods activities will decline. To maintain the level of pro same tection on the original IS consumer goods activities therefore requires an increase in the rate of protection. This pushes up the cost in these activities, and (barring devaluation) thereby lessens their chance of exporting.
3. At the same time that investment costs are rising, at least two other developments are occurring that tend to reduce the country's saving capacity.
As the economy expands its domestic production of consumer goods, their prices may fall relative to those of domestically produced capital goods (RM-2) and income probably shifts away from government as customs duties decline (RM-9). In the second place as the domestic output of consumer goods rises so too does demand for foreign exchange for the impor tation of spare parts, raw material inputs, etc., not all of which can be produced domestically. If these inputs are not forthcoming under-utilization in the consumer good sectors appears. The evi dence of this under-utilization creates obvious pressure for increasing consumption simply because, if the capacity to produce consumer goods exists, it would appear nonsense not to use it. To use it means of course to reduce the saving rate below that which might be achieved. To maintain the saving rate in these -16 circumstances will not produce investment because there is no way to use the resources released from producing consumer goods to produce capital goods, i.e., capacity built to produce consumer goods cannot be used to produce capital goods (RM-16), and exportina is not possible because of high costs. Added to these two reasons is the possibility that the misallocation imposed on the economy by the IS policies will reduce total output below the level it would have reached in the absence of such policies, and hence total saving would tend to fall even if the saving-income rate remained constant.
The outcome appears rather clear: at the very point that the economy must save more in order to maintain its rate of growth of capacity, it has major incentives and pressures to reduce that rate. Essentially, the choice of consumer goods --or the invest ment criteria of least disadvantaged --as the items to import substitute for leads to developments that dampen and may eventually halt the growth that the original protection induced. These growth dampening effects have to do with investment moving into new areas of higher costs --consequent to the failure of the new activities to enter the export market --at the same time that saving declines. This is not, however, the end. There is the further question of the complications arising from the nature of the pro tection afforded the newly created activities. The most common protection package consists of two aspects:
(1) an exchange rate that undervalues foreign exchange and adds extra burdens to the effort to enter the export markets. As already noted, the usual -17 rationale of such a policy is that it keeps the price of imported investment goods relatively low and so encourages investment, plus the assumption that foreign demand for most export items is assumed to be inelastic. (2) Clearly then a successful IS policy must find ways to select the right activities to protect, and must protect them in ways that will not so distort the system that growth is effectively thwarted.
B. Some Specific Aspects of Import Substitution
In order to consider how these latter objectives might be accomplished, it is helpful to look more closely at some specific results that conventional IS practices foster and which seem to be especially damaging. This will enable us to emphasize as well a few hints as to how such effects might be avoided.
These points may be considered under the following headings. External aid may then be claimed on a superficially powerful basis, namely that if the specific shortage is relieved by aid then the capacity made idle by that shortage will be brought into use, and the economy will in consequence begin to grow very rapidly.
This result does hold for a given period, i.e., for a situation already distorted. But aid that simply provides the missing input can in fact do more harm than good. It can enable the economy to continue to function despite the existence of the distortions, i.e., aid can be used only to permit the economy to continue to live with the policies that produced the specific shortages to begin with. Aid used in this way may hinder the correction of the distortions or even knowledge of their existence (RM-21).
Aid used to permit correction of the sources of distortions will have a much more permanent effect on the growth capacity. In order to use aid in this way, however, the distortions must be bared, their origins understood, and their method of elimination known. 
Underlying the IS approach to development is the notion
of an economy that is, as noted in Section II, to be altered. In this sense then investment is aimed at creating a new and different structure that is consistent with the achievement of this objective.
Most of the new activities cannot be operated domestically at rates competitive with similar activities in other parts of the world, and hence protection of some sort is required. Implicit in much of the policymaking of IS is the assumption that costs in the new activities will decline and a new structure will emerge whose routine functioning produces a rising GNP. The argument may be put this way: the products produced and the techniques employed in the developing countries are becoming increasingly obsolete.
This fact Is reflected most clearly, but not exclusively, in deteriorating terms of trade. The country then has a choice with respect to the allocation of its investments: it may put its new resources into traditional activities which are becoming relatively more and more unproductive, or it may put them into new activities that are currently operated at costs well above those that prevail abroad. If it chooses the latter, it must be with the expectation that costs will fall secularly, and at some point the new structure would be composed of activities that can meet world competition (RM-7 and -13).
Evidently then a key question has to do with the rate of fall in costs, the rate of growth of productivity, in the IS activities.
The evidence developed in our studies (especially RM-10 and -17) suggests not only that productivity growth has been generally low relative to that achieved in F.dvanced countries, 2 2. Productivity growbh here, and elsewhere, refers both to labor productivity or "total" (labor and capital) productivity.
but also that the very policies designed to implement the IS -25 approach have been significantly responsible for their poor showing in the productivity growth race. To repeat a point made earlier, to implement their IS policy, countries have chosen instruments and techniques that seem, in effect, to prevent that very policy from being successful. Evidence on this latter point is not without ambiguity, but the kind of distortions noted under item 1 above appear at the heart of the explanation. Added to this is the existence of a situation in which it is generally impossible to exploit economies of scale, in which competition is lacking, in which the imported technology is unsuitable to factor endowment, and in which the educational system fails to grow in quantity and quality (RM-12). More generally one may say that the failure of the conventional IS policy package to take into con sideration the strategic role of productivity growth has resulted in it being not only ignored but discriminated against in the same sense that are exports and a domestic capital goods activity are penalized.
The neglect of productivity growth can in part be traced to the widespread acceptance of a growth model in which physical capital formation is at the heart of the growth process. In paying primary, if not exclusive, attention to physical capital formation, the policymaker neglects not only that (productivity growth) which is crucial to the success of an IS strategy, but, as other studies have shown, that which is responsible for well over half of observed GNP growth in all currently rich countries (RM-22).
5. Finally, it is useful to mention a few rather more specific consequences of most IS policies. Most developing coun tries depend quite heavily on import duties as a source of govern ment finance, and as consumer good imports usually carry a high tariff relative to capital goods, the complete protection of the former can contribute to a government finance problem (RM-9). It indeed may do more. Since income taxes are difficult to enforce, it may push the government into greater reliance on excise duties, and possibly export duties, as a means of acquiring finance. A second point that merits a specific note has to do with the effect of IS on the trade balance. There is little evidence that even hints that the trade balance improves as a consequence of IS policies. This is surely the case in the short run, but seems true as well in the longer run. This is partly explained by the widespread tehdency of IS policies to discriminate against exports, but also by the failure of IS to reduce imports or import-GNP ratios, i.e., IS policies do not reduce the demand for imports.
(This point comes through in several RM, especially . all of the points mentioned here is that the economic structure that the IS approach to development spawns is no more flexible and adaptable than the one that is sought to be replaced. Flexi bility, adaptability, responsiveness are attributes the advantages of which are disputed by no one, and their acquisition is part of the goal sought after. Again, however, we have found that policies aimed at this goal have the opposite impact and to solidify the structure rather than to grease the wheels on which it operates.
Although little evidence exists that helps our understanding of why some economies appear much more flexible and responsive than other economies, our studies do suggest that the very alien-ness of the imposed new structure does play a relevant role (RM-10 and '
*V -17).
A simple example may illustrate this point. A machine imported by a low income, non-growing country not only creates a required flow of imported spare parts and raw materials, but it can also impose new skill demands, supply and marketing demands, work attitude and organizational demands. This latter group of demands is such that the importing economy cannot respond quickly and easily to meet effectively a situation other than that called for by the exact formula envisaged-in the operation of the new machine (lRM-10).
The situation is somewhat similar to a firmly established, well-groomed bureaucracy that works splendidly as long as the routine is uninterrupted, but virtually collapses 
III
Our positive results may be considered under three broad headings: distortions, productivity growth, and what earlier was alled alien-ness.
1.
The most pervasive impact of IS policies has been that it distorts the economy, and these distortions do not, except in rare instances, correct themselves. Indeed, as shown above, economies become increasingly distorted as the IS process continues.
Three assumptions seem to underlie much of the analysis that leads to the policies that in turn produce the distortion. One has to do with the assumptions about the responsiveness of the various sectors of the system to relative price changes, the second to the existence and impact of external and internal economies that accompany the establishment of new activities, and the third to the role of capital formation in development. If one assumes that relative prices have no effect on anything then they can be safely ignored, and distortion loses much of its meaning. Consequently, the policymaker can ignore the impact of misleading price signals on his economy. Similarly, if expected external (or internal) economies are assumed great enough, then any activity can be justified, and there appears great, and unsupported, optimism implied by many policies as to the existence of such economies in the newly established activities. And, an assumption seems to prevail that amounts essentially to the assertion that a high rate of physical capital formation can overcome any obstacle. Evidence from several of our studies strongly suggests that none of these assumptions can support the weight that it is asked to bear.
The most specific evidence on the role prices can play has to do with foreign trade. In RM-11 Sheahan's regressions leave little doubt that maintaining reasonably correct exchange rates does have a significant effect on export earnings from Colombia's exports other than coffee and oil. Clark's equations explaining Brazilian imports (RM-8) show price elasticities ranging from -.35
for capital equipment to -1.62 for the construction material industry
While elasticities with respect to investment (the stand-in for GNP) were higher than the price elasticities for four of the six groups for which both investment and price elasticities were avail able, this evidence indicates again that sufficient substitutability between domestic and imported goods exists in Brazil, that to ignore it will induce distortion. The extent to which the Colombtan and Brazilian equations represent demand or supply parameters can not be told from either set of equations. Doubtless to some extent both are effective so that the computed coefficients are probably not estimates of a structural parameter. Nevertheless, these results do indicate that a price effect does exist and which in turn indicates substitutability and responsiveness in the economies of significant magnitude.
The argument is made somewhat clearer when it is put in a broader theoretical context that includes a domestic absorption component.
In RM-22 it is shown that devaluation (perhaps exchange rate correction is a more revealing term) unaccompanied by measures to curtail domestic absorption of domestically produced goods may be thwarted, not because foreign demand is inelastic, but because the level of domestic demand relative to output for the exportables does not permit exports to respond. The evidence in Pakistan and
Colombia and other Latin American countries support the close link between exchange rate policy and the policies that affect domestic absorption.
All this adds up to the simple point that the level and rate of growth of exports and imports can be influenced in a predictable manner by policies that affect domestic prices and domestic absorption.
There is evidence on this issue on a more general level. These arguments have two broad categories of implications.
In the first place they mean that distortions are very real, and must be taken into account in devising and appraising policies.
For example, if there were no substitutability between labor and capital (and among products), then the relative cost of labor and In general then, we can say that the degree of flexibility and adaptability suggested by our studies shows the! many policies aimed at specific targets impose distortions or the system that make it difficult or impossible to achieve the specified target.
The second implication is even broader than the first and follows from it. Our studies suggest that the misallocations produced by conventional IS policies not only reduce total output beo'.ow the level that it might have otherwise reached, but it also reluces the growth rate, principally through its effect on pro ductivity growth and the flexibility of the economy. This means simply that the distortion issue is a most strategic concept, strategic to the point that to ignore it is to court failure.
This we believe to be a vital point, and more will be said on its specific policy implications later.
2. We have emphasized that IS seems to create activities that are broadly alien to the economic and social environment of the community. Alien here applies not only to the factor endowment as such, but refers also to the whole range of characteristics and attributes of a society that affect its capacity to produce goods and services and to respond to unpredicted opportunities (and setbacks). Alien-ness is not independent of, but also not simply a component of, the distortion issue just discussed. In RM-4 Sheahan's model of the Colombia economy shows how that economy became more rigid, more dependent on imports as the alien-ness of its economic structure evolved. This may be con trasted somewhat with Mexico, the structure of which evolved in a manner much more consistent with her social and cultural heritage entrepreneurial ability, organizing capacity, and management skills
These matters are difficult to separate from the distortion issue already emphasized. The key point seems to be this: that if a country's economy evolves in a manner consistent with its resource endowment, then that endowment can be near fully exploited 3. The argument above indicated that the conventional approach to IS creates conditions that dampens productivity growth, and rapid productivity growth is essential to a successful IS.
So an important positive notion emerging from our studies is that countries must pursue policies that lead to a high productive growt]
or IS must fail. The question of course is what are such policies?
The first point to emphasize is simply that productivity growth does not just happen. It is not a time trend to be appended. It is rather a phenomenon to be explained, and despite the absence of data and argument it seems clear that it (productivity growth) is and can be affected by economic policies.
In -37
qhfe.,, this issue is treated most explicitly, evidence seems to Lnd.,,-ite that productivity growth is more likely to reach acceptable -ate in economies where distortions and alien-ness are at a minimuT lertt.:nly it is correct to say that there is nothing incompatible bet we* -distortion free economies and the achievement of an accept able -rowth of productivity. Evidently any policy which leads to fullc: utilization of capital will add to productivity growth.
The r*udy of Winston (RM-25) on capacity utilization has implica tion. not only for increasing the productivity of capital directly, but aso is important in terms of the preventing of bottlenecks whic: in turn dampen the productivity growth of other inputs. More generiilly the link between productivity growth and exports (RM-13
an. -?2) shows not onl.y that productivity growth facilitates the expar31on of exports itself, but by so doing makes the system much les vulnerable to the supply bottlenecks that tend to cripple the ,who--economy.
Stronger positive statements are more difficult. In general it c es seem clear that most developing countries are not paying su".-clent attention to the possibilities of adapting and modify in.-imported physical capital in such a way that it more nearly fi.,: their domestic economies. To do this probably means the a8±. cation of more resources explicitly to this task. It certainly mezvis a conscious recognition of the necessity of this sort of " ,ivity by both government and the private sector. General con-E lerations indicate that this can best be done at the firm or ant level. Hence, policies that put pressure on firms or that provide an incentive to them to seek ways to increase the pro ductivity of their resources are an essential ingredient of development policy.
With respect to ,the eI,!ec q of education on the productivity of labor, two general points' nerge from RI-12 and the literature cited there. In the first place the shortage of the kind of skills learned in the classroom do not appear to be a specific bottleneck.
The educational establishment does not turn out individuals who are immediately employed to break a bottleneck. Rather, the productivity effect of education is to equip a person to adapt and to respond to opportunities as they appear. Perhaps most directly they equip a person to profit from on-the-job training.
The second point has to do with the quality of education. In economies where productivity is generally low, it is unlikely that it is high in the difficult tasks of educating. This means that many countries that are spending large sums on education may be doing it on rather low productivity activities. The not very startling idea emerges then that the developing countries may not need more education of the kind currently being provided, but rather improved productivity of the educational activities.
Productivity growth probably is not completely explained by allocation, by technological improvements, and by raising the quality of labor. These, however, are surely a significant part of the key to its understanding. The evidence that productivity growth is a strategic element in the picture of a successful IS policy means, therefore, that these matters are equally a significant part of the key to the devising of effective development policy.
IV
In the preceding sections we have discussed the general content of the usual approach to IS, have tried to identify the specific aspects of that approach that seems to account for the difficulties that so many countries following IS policies find themselves in, and finally we sought to outline in very broad terms what appeared as the more positive findings of our studies.
In this final section we seek to consider these positive issues in terms of more specific types of policies and strategies that emerge from our work. A full discussion of specific policy measures is part of our objective in the future research projects to be undertaken.
None of the studies suggests a simple laissez-faire, free trade approach. Similarly no paper denies the advantages of industrialization in particular, or, more generally, the importance of changes in the structure of the developing economies and in the composition of their output. More importantly, the idea of a strategy, as defined earlier in this paper, has great merit.
There is much evidence that many governments attack the development problem on too many fronts. The consequence of this is not only that demands are placed on the administrative machinery which cannot be met, but also that policies often counter each other and full consequences of all aspects of the attack are not 0 understood (see above item 2, Part B of Section II). Therefore, the notion that the attack on the development objective should consist of a small number of strategic policy areas has great merit. The question of which areas the government should direct its attention depends of course on the assumptions that are made as to how the specific economy function-and as to the nature of the growth mechanism. As emphasized above, the IS strategy as con ventionally practiced rests on assumptions which our studies have seriously questioned.
What then can we say about strategic variables and mechanism of growth on the basis of the preceding discussion of our findings?
And what kind of policies exploit these variables and these mechanisms at the same time that they induce industrialization and structural changes that are recognized as necessary for develop ment?
Our analysis suggests that three items, distortion, alien ness, and productivity growth, are more demanding of attention, i.e., more strategic, than those variables which have occupied attention in the conventional IS model. Since governments cannot do everything, they should then concentrate on these issues.
Specific policies would then be appraised as to the extent to which they (i) distort or undistort the system, (ii) encourage projects consistent with the other characteristics of the economy, and (iii) encourage productivity growth. If policies are successful in these areas, then other conditions necessary for continued growth (e.g., capital formation) may be expected to be induced or to be achievable without major policy measures. To repeat our well-worn theme, it is attacks on these other, these "non-strategic growth producing variables that violate our strategic variables and cause the difficulties which we have found to inhere in the IS strategy.
What kinds of policies make sense in this general context?
The following are submitted with brief comments as to policies that are consistent with the above stated approach to development policymaking. 4. Tax advantages based on productivity growth. The idea here of course is to encourage productivity growth by means addi tional to ordinary profit expectations. Note that it is pro ductivity growth that is rewarded not a high productivity. Indeed, a high level of labor productivity in a firm may be due to the use of a technique that, from the economy's point of view, is quite uneconomic.
5. Tax advantages or subsidies based on labor employed (or tax on capital employed). This is the simplest way to introduce some correction for the common existence of a labor market in which wage rates exceed labor's opportunity cost. One commonly observes, of course, tax advantages or interest subsidies to firms on the basis of investment.
6. Indirect taxes or subsidies aimed at correcting market imperfections. Such taxes can help compensate for monopoly practices, but more generally they can be used to reduce the difference between social and private costs and returns. Examples have to do with electricity use, road use, and tariffs on capital goods.
7. Establishment of activities that provide market infor mation on a wide scale. Such information can help with investment allocation decisions, with inducement to invest, and with the firm's planning as to production, inventory, etc., all of which add to the efficiency of its operations.
8. Foreign aid to be used to implement policies. Many policies can often be implemented only if there is give in the system to allow for lags. Aid aimed at facilitating the dis mantling of controls, of devaluing, or curtailing inflation pro ducing deficit spending may serve much better than aid to supplemer domestic saving or aid to cover an alleged import gap.
9. A greater emphasis on direct taxes. Direct taxes are the most difficult to enforce, but they also are the most powerful and most discriminating. Countries will not learn to enforce such taxes unless they try to enforce them, and the mere fact that they are now difficult to levy and collect is not a reason for ignoring them and relying heavily on indirect taxes for government revenue purposes.
Technical aid aimed at helping people to go about
understanding what can be done in the context of their own environ ment. The tendency in technical aid programs has been to teach people in poor countries how things are done in rich countries.
Our various arguments above have shown that this contributes to the alien-ness that we have found so damaging and to the misallo cations which we have found equally harmful to the development effort.
A full examination of these policy types cannot be under taken here, but they will be investigated in more detail and with more specificity in the next stage of the research program.
